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I. INTRODUCTION
Securities fraud poses a major threat to the financial security of
millions of investors. Stock fraud and the brokerage firms perpetrating
it thrive, bilking investors out of millions of dollars annually. The North
American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA), an association
comprised of state and regional securities regulators, estimates that
investors lose $6 billion a year to investment fraud, including micro-cap
stock fraud.1 In 2000, Bradley Skolnick, the Indiana Securities
Commissioner and former head of the NASAA, stated that boiler rooms
were “the single greatest source of investment scams.”2 Yet defrauded
investors are unlikely to recover funds lost to fraud, because these firms
rarely operate with adequate reserves to pay settlements or awards.3
Furthermore, the firms, their principals, and their brokers typically
declare bankruptcy to avoid liability.4
Under these circumstances, it comes as no surprise that investors
attempt to recover from the larger clearing firms that process trades for
these smaller broker-dealers; often there is no one else to go to. In
addition, the clearing firms play an important role in the fraud. The New
1. California Department of Corporations, Micro-Cap Fraud, at http://www.corp.
ca.gov/pub/microcap.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2002). Micro-cap stocks are typically
shares of companies that are not well established and have only a small amount of shares
in public hands. Id. Firms perpetrating micro-cap stock fraud are often referred to as
“boiler rooms” or “bucket shops.” JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN,
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 58 (5th ed. 1998).
2. Ken Berzof, Unscrupulous ‘Boiler Rooms’ Aim to Burn the Investor, COURIERJ. (Louisville), Feb. 28, 2000, at C1.
3. See N.Y. STATE ATT’Y GEN. BUREAU OF INVESTOR PROT. & SEC., REPORT ON
MICRO-CAP STOCK FRAUD 15–16 (1997) [hereinafter REPORT ON MICRO-CAP STOCK
FRAUD].
4. See id.
Problem brokers have been likened to cockroaches, because when the
lights are turned on by regulators, the brokers scatter and regroup somewhere
else. . . .
. . . [E]ven if . . . an award is made against a broker, the broker often gets
the award discharged by filing for personally (sic) bankruptcy. Even if the
award remains unpaid it is not a debarring circumstance for NASD licensure.
Id. Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) insurance coverage does not provide
very much, if any, protection for investors. See Albert B. Crenshaw, Group Assails
Insurer of Investors, WASH. POST, July 21, 1999, at E1; Gretchen Morgenson, U.S.
Report Faults Agency that Oversees Investor Claims, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2001, at C1.
Note that this problem has been ameliorated by the passage of the Corporate and
Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, which makes debts incurred in violation of
securities laws nondischargeable in bankruptcy. Corporate and Criminal Fraud
Accountability Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 803, 116 Stat. 745 (to be codified at
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19)).
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York Attorney General’s Office stated:
Many of these firms use big-name clearing houses to carry out their
activities. The clearing firms’ policies and procedures regarding these smaller
firms’ practices frequently amount to a blind eye, or worse. . . .
Micro-cap brokerage firms can only exist by processing their transactions
through the road provided by the clearing firms. Existing regulatory “speed
bumps” to prevent fraud have proven ineffective. It is time to re-examine the
responsibilities and obligations of clearing firms in light of the widespread fraud
involved in the telemarketing of low-priced stocks.5

In the past, investors typically lost these cases. Clearing firms argued
successfully that even had they had actual knowledge of the fraud being
perpetrated by the brokerage firm, they had no duty to do anything about
it.6 Recently, however, the tides have started to turn for investors
attempting to hold clearing firms liable for the fraud of an introducing
firm. A recent National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
arbitration award has provoked controversy by finding secondary
liability for the clearing firm Hanifen, Imhoff Clearing Corporation (now
known as Fiserv Correspondent Services) for the fraud of the brokerage
firm Duke & Company, under the state securities laws of California and
Washington.7 A federal district court in Oregon upheld the award, and
the Ninth Circuit affirmed on appeal.8 The antifraud section of the
Washington statute is modeled on the Uniform Securities Act of 1956
(Uniform Act),9 currently adopted in thirty-four states.10 This Comment
5. See REPORT ON MICRO-CAP STOCK FRAUD, supra note 3, at 3.
6. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has brought successful
enforcement actions against clearing firms; most notably, against Bear, Stearns in 1999,
related to Bear, Stearns’s clearing activities for A.R. Baron. See generally Bear, Stearns
Sec. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 41,707, 70 SEC No. 710 (Aug. 5, 1999). A.R.
Baron engaged in widespread micro-cap stock fraud from 1992 to 1996. Id. at 712–14.
The firm declared bankruptcy in 1996, shortly after the SEC issued a cease and desist
order. Id. at 711 & n.2. The firm and many of its officers and employees were indicted
for fraud, and most pled guilty to grand larceny and enterprise corruption. Id. at 712.
7. See Koruga v. Wang, No. 98-04276, 2000 WL 33534559 (N.A.S.D. Oct. 2,
2000) (Meyer, Hywel & Dunnington, Arbs.). For a discussion of the controversy, see
John A. Byrne, Another Regulatory Landmine for Traders, TRADERS MAG., March 1,
2001, 2001 WL 9059572; and Gretchen Morgenson, Striking a Blow for the Little Guy,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001, § 3, at 1.
8. Koruga v. Fiserv Correspondent Servs., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D. Or. 2001),
aff’d, No. 01-35295, 2002 WL 530548 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2002) (unpublished opinion).
9. See I LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 42 n.39, 74
n.114 (3d ed. 1998).
10. Id. at 42. A number of the states that have not adopted the Uniform Act have
adopted antifraud provisions that are either similar to or broader than those portions of
the Uniform Act. Id. at 73–76 & nn.114–16. Although California securities laws are not
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argues that secondary liability under state blue sky laws that are modeled
on the Uniform Act provides a viable theory under which clearing firms
may be liable to investors for the fraud of an introducing firm.11
Part II of this Comment defines and describes the relationship between
introducing and clearing firms, outlines the role of the clearing firm in
the perpetuation of micro-cap stock fraud, and identifies arguments in
favor of extending liability to clearing firms under some circumstances.
Part III explains the impact of arbitration on securities fraud claims and
illustrates the effect of recent arbitration awards holding clearing firms
liable for the fraud of introducing firms. Part IV discusses existing
federal law regarding secondary liability for clearing firms. Part V
presents an analysis of the secondary liability provisions of the Uniform
Act as they may be applied to clearing firms.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTRODUCING FIRMS AND
CLEARING FIRMS
A. Definitions and Roles
An “introducing firm” or “introducing broker” is a brokerage firm that
deals directly with the public and originates customer accounts.12 The
introducing firm is engaged in the business of soliciting or receiving
orders for transactions from customers and is the primary point of
contact for the customer. Many introducing firms are small, with little
in the way of capital.13 Smaller firms are usually unable to process their
own transactions from beginning to end due to the high costs involved.14
They may not possess the expertise or technology necessary to process
every aspect of a transaction.15 As a result, introducing firms contract
with clearing firms to do this work for them.
A “clearing firm” (also known as a “carrying broker” or “carrying
firm”)16 is usually a large, well-capitalized brokerage firm that provides
based on the Uniform Act, many of the fraud provisions are similar. Id. at 83–86.
11. This Comment will refer to the Uniform Securities Act of 1956, because the
1985 Act has not been adopted by many states. Id. at 42. The antifraud provisions of the
1985 Act are nearly identical, however. Id. at 71 n.108.
12. See Henry F. Minnerop, The Role and Regulation of Clearing Brokers, 48 BUS.
LAW. 841, 841–43 (1993); see also William J. Fitzpatrick & Ronald T. Carman, An
Analysis of the Business and Legal Relationship Between Introducing and Carrying
Brokers, 40 BUS. LAW. 47, 47 n.2 (1984) (providing a discussion of these terms, which
are not explicitly defined in the regulations).
13. See Minnerop, supra note 12, at 842–43.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Clearing firms “carry” the accounts of introducing firms. See Net Capital
Requirements for Brokers or Dealers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2002).
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a wide variety of services to the introducing firm.17 These services can
include:
the maintenance of books and records; the receipt, custody, and delivery of
customer securities and funds; the extension of credit to finance customer
transactions in margin accounts; and . . . the execution of transactions on
exchanges or on the over-the-counter markets. Most important, clearing firms
“clear” transactions—paying for securities purchased and delivering securities
sold in the accounts introduced to them . . . .18

The relationship between clearing firms and introducing firms is
governed by contract, within the parameters set by the regulatory
agencies.19 The most common type of clearing agreement is the “fully
disclosed” agreement.20 In this type of agreement, the clearing firm
sends out trade confirmation slips and statements directly to customers,
whose names and addresses are disclosed to the clearing firm.21
Customers are informed of the existence of the clearing firm, the
clearing agreement, and the relative roles and responsibilities of the
clearing and introducing firms.22
One of the most important functions played by clearing firms relates
to the extension of credit. In most cases, the clearing firm commits to
pay for purchases and to deliver securities for the introducing firm. If a
customer does not pay for securities by the settlement date of the
transaction, the clearing firm must provide the funds to pay for the
The clearing agreement generally makes payment the
trades.23
responsibility of the introducing firm.24 As a result, the clearing firm
often extends credit to the introducing firm, which consequently
“becomes a debtor of the clearing firm.”25 The clearing firm must gain
17. See Minnerop, supra note 12, at 841, 844.
18. Id. at 841.
19. For a discussion of clearing agreements, see Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note
12, at 47–52.
20. Minnerop, supra note 12, at 843. Other types of clearing agreements include
“omnibus” agreements, where the clearing firm and the customers of the introducing
firms have no knowledge of each others’ identities, and “professional” clearing
agreements, which do not involve public customers. Id. at 843 & n.7.
21. Id. at 843.
22. See id. These responsibilities are identified in NYSE Rule 382(b). NYSE
CONSTITUTION AND RULES, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2382 (Aug. 31, 1999).
23. See NAT’L SEC. CLEARING CORP., RULES AND PROCEDURES, Rule 2, § 1, at 13 (Aug. 1,
2002), http://www.nscc.com/legal/nsccrules.pdf; see also Minnerop, supra note 12, at 844–45.
24. See Minnerop, supra note 12, at 845.
25. Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 41,707, 70 SEC No. 710,
715 (Aug. 5, 1999).
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the approval of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or NASD to
extend credit,26 and must keep records regarding the extension of credit.
This includes, in the case of the NYSE, sending monthly reports of
introducing firms whose requested settlement extensions exceed two
percent of those firms’ monthly transactions.27
B. The Growth of Clearing as a Business
The growth of clearing has its basis in a few significant rule changes.28
In 1982, the SEC approved the NYSE rule changes that allowed clearing
firms to allocate supervisory functions to introducing firms in the
clearing agreement.29 This rule change allowed clearing firms to assign
supervisory responsibility to the introducing firms regarding compliance of
their representatives with securities regulations.30 The clearing agreement
delineating the responsibilities of each of the parties must be filed with
and approved by the NYSE.31 The growth of the clearing business since
1982 has been attributed in large part to this rule change; clearing
became easier and cheaper, because it now involved less risk to the
clearing broker.32
Another development that impacted the growth of the clearing
business was the introduction in 1975 of a lenient uniform net capital
rule.33 The net capital rule specified the amount of cash reserves a firm
26. The NYSE and NASD are self-regulatory organizations (SROs) that govern
their member firms. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) must approve all
NYSE and NASD rule changes and can suggest additional rule changes to the SROs.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(b)–(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)–(c) (2000). See
generally VI LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 9, at 2715–32 (3d ed., rev. 2002) (discussing
the rulemaking relationships between these organizations).
27. See NYSE Info. Memo No. 94–22, at 2 (June 10, 1994), available at 1994
NYSE Info. Memo LEXIS 51; NYSE Interp. Memo No. 97-4 (Aug. 28, 1997), 1997
NYSE Interp. Memo LEXIS 7, at *133.
28. See Minnerop, supra note 12, at 846–51, for a discussion of this issue.
29. Order Approving NYSE Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No.
18,497, 47 Fed. Reg. 8284 (Feb. 25, 1982). For a discussion of the 1982 changes to
NYSE Rules 382 and 405, see also NYSE Info. Memo No. 82–18 (Mar. 5, 1982), available
at 1982 NYSE Info. Memo LEXIS 57; and Minnerop, supra note 12, at 848–50.
30. See Order Approving NYSE Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release
No. 18,497, 47 Fed. Reg. at 8284. This rule change does not eliminate all liability from
clearing firms, however. See Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp., 710 SEC at 715 (Aug. 5, 1999)
(“[N]o contractual arrangement for the allocation of functions between an introducing
and carrying organization can operate to relieve either organization from their respective
responsibilities under the federal securities laws and applicable SRO rules.” (quoting
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 18,497, 42 Fed.
Reg. at 8284 n.2)).
31. NYSE CONSTITUTION AND RULES, Rule 382(a), 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶
2382 (Aug. 31, 1999).
32. Minnerop, supra note 12, at 846.
33. Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2002).
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must have in order to engage in the securities business. Before the 1975
rule, each exchange set its own requirements, which were comparatively
quite high. These exchange rules posed a substantial barrier to entry into
securities markets. In 1975, the SEC set new net capital requirements at
only $5000 for introducing firms that cleared through clearing firms
with adequate capital on a fully disclosed basis.34 Net capital
requirements have since been increased to $100,000 for most
introducing firms,35 but even with these increases, the minimums are not
difficult to meet. As a result of these lenient requirements, smaller firms
are able to participate in the securities business as long as they clear their
trades through an adequately capitalized clearing firm. The growth of
the clearing business has been attributed to the easy entry into the market
provided by lenient net capital requirements.36
Clearing has become a serious business. The number of introducing
firms utilizing a clearing firm has grown from 564 in 1975 to 5030 in
2000,37 and that number is expected to increase.38 It is estimated that
eighty-five percent of brokerage firms are introducing firms that utilize
the services of a clearing firm.39 Smaller, thinly capitalized firms are
able to enter the market, utilizing the services of larger, well-capitalized
clearing firms.
C. Clearing Firms and Micro-Cap Stock Fraud
1. Financial Responsibility
One sign of stock fraud that is readily apparent to clearing firms is the
illegal behavior that introducing firms undertake in order to meet net
capital requirements. As discussed above, the net capital requirement is
$100,000 for most introducing firms of the type involved in micro-cap
34. Id.; see also Minnerop, supra note 12, at 847–48.
35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(2). The exact amount varies depending on the type
of firm. The $100,000 requirement is for firms that clear customer transactions through
another dealer (a clearing firm) but engage in market making activities of over-thecounter (OTC) stocks; this applies to most introducing firms engaging in this type of
micro-cap stock fraud. Id.
36. Minnerop, supra note 12, at 846–48.
37. Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities Industry Association, Inc. at 5–6, Koruga v.
Fiserv Correspondent Servs., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D. Or. 2001) (No. 00-1415 MA)
(citing Henry F. Minnerop, Recent Developments in the Regulation of Clearing Brokers,
1 J. INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE 27, 32 (2000)).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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stock fraud,40 and includes limits on the amount any particular security
can count toward meeting the requirements.41 If a firm has a substantial
concentration of a few securities, which is commonly the case with firms
involved in micro-cap stock fraud, it must heavily discount the value of
those securities when calculating its net capital.42
Introducing firms engaging in fraud utilize a number of strategies
designed to work around the over-concentration requirements. The
strategies generally involve temporarily converting securities to cash for
the purpose of meeting the requirements. For example, introducing
firms utilize a practice known as “parking.”43 To reduce the net capital
requirements it would otherwise be subject to, the introducing firm
executes a number of transactions every night, usually just before the
markets close. The firm parks the securities in a third party’s accounts,
then moves the shares back to the firm’s proprietary account the next
morning. Another strategy is to execute unauthorized sales in customer
accounts.44 When the customer complains, the firm may buy the shares
back, keep them in the customer’s account despite the complaint, or sell
them to another customer—with or without authorization.45
In addition, clearing firms often become aware of fraud through
activities connected with the extension of credit.46 As noted above,
clearing firms are responsible for paying for purchases and delivering
securities for the introducing firm. Customers often refuse to pay for
these unauthorized trades.47 The clearing firm must then either get
approval from the introducing firm to cancel the trade or request a credit
extension from the NYSE or the NASD.48
Clearing firms are required to keep records documenting credit extension
40.
41.
42.
43.

17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(2)(iii); see supra note 35.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(M).
Id.
The SEC described parking as follows:
“Parking” refers to the practice of concealing stock ownership by placing
the stock in the account of a third party, while secretly retaining the obligation
to repurchase that stock at a future date. While persons may park stock for a
variety of reasons[,] Baron parked stock to maintain the appearance of
compliance with the Commission’s net capital rules. . . . Because the
securities in its proprietary accounts were exclusively house stocks, for which,
in calculating net capital, a substantial haircut was required[,] Baron had a
strong incentive to park those stocks before calculating net capital.
Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 41,707, 70 SEC No. 710, 714 n.6
(Aug. 5, 1999).
44. REPORT ON MICRO-CAP STOCK FRAUD, supra note 3, at 39–40.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 82–85.
47. Id. at 82.
48. NYSE Info. Memo No. 94–22, at 2 (June 10, 1994), available at 1994 NYSE
Info. Memo LEXIS 51; NYSE Interp. Memo No. 97-4 (Aug. 28, 1997), 1997 NYSE
Interp. Memo LEXIS 7, at *133.
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requests.49 Repeated problems with unpaid purchases and canceled
transactions suggest underlying fraud.50 If the introducing firm goes
under, the clearing firm is still obligated to make good on transactions and
can incur substantial liability for trades for which the introducing firm has
failed to pay.51 As a result, the clearing firm has an interest in obtaining
approval for extensions and prohibiting unauthorized trades.
Clearing firms often become aware of an introducing firm’s fraud in
connection with activities related to these financial responsibility
standards.52 Clearing firms that continue to allow introducing firms to
operate after becoming aware of this behavior are important components
of the fraudulent activity.53 In the case of A.R. Baron, for example, the
SEC found that Bear, Stearns had knowingly aided the introducing firm
in its violation of the net capital requirements.54 The SEC determined
that Bear, Stearns knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that A.R. Baron
engaged in unauthorized trading and parking of securities.55 By
continuing to clear trades for A.R. Baron, Bear, Stearns aided and
abetted the violation of these requirements.56
2. Customer Complaints
Clearing firms may also become aware of the introducing firm’s fraud
through customer complaints. Customers often send complaints directly
to clearing firms, especially after calls to their broker and the introducing
49. Id.
50. REPORT ON MICRO-CAP STOCK FRAUD, supra note 3, at 85.
51. See NAT’L SEC. CLEARING CORP., supra note 23, Rule 2, § 1, at 13.
52. See, e.g., Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 41,707, 70 SEC
No. 710, 718 (Aug. 5, 1999) (“[C]lassic indications” of unauthorized trading and parking
include “a high incidence of failures to pay for trades, excessive trade cancellations,
corrections and credit extensions, numerous customer complaints against Baron and a
pattern of stock being sold to customers from Baron’s inventory and then purchased back
into the inventory by Baron close to settlement at a loss.”); see also REPORT ON MICROCAP STOCK FRAUD, supra note 3, at 84–85.
53. REPORT ON MICRO-CAP STOCK FRAUD, supra note 3, at 74 (“In the world of
levitating house stocks a clearing broker that will extend credit and execute trades when
a micro-cap brokerage firm has no capital is a great ally.”).
54. Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp., 710 SEC at 726–27.
55. Id.
56. There is no private right of action for aiding and abetting under federal
securities laws. See discussion infra Part III. The SEC can bring these actions, however,
as a result of 1995 legislation amending section 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–67, §104,
109 Stat. 757 (1995) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2000)).
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firm prove ineffective.57 In 1999, the SEC approved amendments to
NYSE Rule 382 and NASD Rule 3230 that increase the responsibilities
of clearing firms regarding the reporting of customer complaints.58 Prior
to the amendments, the clearing firm often ignored customer complaints,
referring the customer back to the introducing firm.59 Clearing firms
even ignored customer requests to halt all trading in their accounts as a
result of unauthorized trading.60 The new rules require the clearing firm
to send customer complaints both to the introducing firm and to the
appropriate self-regulatory organization (SRO) as well as notify the
customer in writing that the complaint has been submitted to these
parties.61
3. History of Illegal or Suspicious Activity
Many clearing firms have reason to believe that an introducing firm
may perpetrate micro-cap stock fraud before the firm even opens its
doors; performing due diligence on an introducing firm before beginning
a clearing relationship, a common industry practice, can uncover a
history of illegal activity by the principals or brokers.62 Firms like
Merrill Lynch regularly look into the prior practices, disciplinary
history, and regulatory actions of a firm and its principals and brokers
prior to entering into a clearing agreement.63 This type of due diligence
often uncovers indications that a firm may engage in fraudulent
behavior.64 For example, an Oregon arbitration panel found that the
clearing firm Hanifen, Imhoff Clearing Corporation (Hanifen) had actual
knowledge that the principals and salespeople of Duke & Company had
been involved in fraudulent activities while at the firm Stratton
Oakmont.65
57. See REPORT ON MICRO-CAP STOCK FRAUD, supra note 3, at 71–72.
58. See Clearing Agreements, Exchange Act Release No. 34-41468, 64 Fed. Reg.
31,024, at 31,025 (June 2, 1999) (approving NASD rule changes); Carrying Agreements,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-41464, 64 Fed. Reg. 31,338 (June 2, 1999) (approving
NYSE rule changes).
59. See REPORT ON MICRO-CAP STOCK FRAUD, supra note 3, at 71–72.
60. See id.
61. NYSE CONSTITUTION AND RULES, Rule 382(a), 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶
2382 (Aug. 31, 1999). NYSE member firms are subject to the guidelines provided by
the NYSE. NASD member firms are subject to NASD rules.
62. See REPORT ON MICRO-CAP STOCK FRAUD, supra note 3, at 78–80.
63. See id. at 78.
64. See id. at 79.
65. Koruga v. Wang, No. 98-04276, 2000 WL 33534559, at *9 (N.A.S.D. Oct. 2,
2000) (Meyer, Hywel & Dunnington, Arbs.). Stratton Oakmont was permanently expelled
from the securities industry in 1996 after engaging in widespread micro-cap stock fraud for
many years. Dist. Bus. Conduct Comm. for Dist. No. 10 v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc.,
Complaint No. C10950081, 1996 NASD Discip. LEXIS 52, at *55 (N.A.S.D. Dec. 5, 1996).
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D. Why Clearing Firms Should Be Liable for Fraud
Micro-cap stock fraud follows a familiar pattern—the introducing firm
engages in market manipulation, unauthorized trading, parking of securities,
excessive trading, or refusing to execute sell orders.66 The clearing firm
ignores customer complaints, often referring the investors back to the
introducing firm, who generally has already failed to respond to that
same complaint.67 The clearing firm is well aware that the broker’s
activities look fraudulent.68 It continues to extend credit and facilitate
transactions that assist the introducing firm in meeting its net capital
requirements, knowing that if it fails to do so, the introducing firm will
go under and will be unable to pay money owed to the clearing firm.
The clearing firm does these things, apparently secure in the belief that it
will not be held liable for the securities fraud perpetrated by the
introducing firm—even if it knows of the fraud, and even if it assists the
introducing firm in its commission.69
The signs of securities fraud are apparent to clearing firms.70
Protecting investors is a primary goal of securities laws.71 Allowing
clearing firms to continue to process transactions for an introducing firm
under these circumstances runs counter to the need to protect investors.
In fact, the current industry-wide belief that clearing firms will not be
held liable for knowingly assisting an introducing firm’s fraud has
encouraged clearing firms to turn a blind eye to fraud.72 Imposing
liability on clearing firms that have reason to know of securities fraud
serves a powerful deterrent function.
Clearing firms should be liable for the fraud of introducing firms
because most victims of securities fraud have no other recourse. A
66. See REPORT ON MICRO-CAP STOCK FRAUD, supra note 3, at 33–44.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Koruga, 2000 WL 33534559, at *9.
70. REPORT ON MICRO-CAP STOCK FRAUD, supra note 3, at 72–73, 85; see also
Gary Weiss, How the SEC Is Passing the Buck on Microcaps, BUS. WK., May 18, 1998,
at 150 (stating that clearing firms “often are the first to see the ‘red flags’ of stock
fraud”).
71. See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 296
(1993).
72. See, e.g., Koruga v. Wang, No. 98-04276, 2000 WL 33534559, at *22
(N.A.S.D. Oct. 2, 2000) (Meyer, Hywel & Dunnington, Arbs.) (noting that clearing firm
Hanifen’s position was that it would be unfair to impose liability, because the clearing
firm believed that the law insulated them from liability).
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recent article in Barron’s, recounting a conversation with Barry
Goldsmith, executive vice president of enforcement for the NASD,
stated: “Most victims of securities fraud never see a dime in
restitution . . . because firms go out of business or ‘morph into
something else.’”73 Individual brokers and control persons typically
declare bankruptcy.74 A select few are criminally prosecuted. Most
firms have no assets once the fraud is uncovered.75 Firms withdraw
from registration as broker-dealers, often reopening under different
names.76 One 1998 analysis of the SEC penalty collection rate showed
that the SEC “collects only about half of the financial penalties it
imposes on securities-law violators, leaving $2.5 billion uncollected
over the past 13 years.”77 The article goes on to add that “[a]mong the
biggest nonpayers are some major alleged purveyors of small-stock
fraud.”78 Firms often declare bankruptcy after being hit with a
judgment.79 This 1998 report focused on the SEC collection rate for its
own financial penalties, but the same issues are exacerbated in the
collection of civil judgments.
Industry members argue that if liability is imposed on clearing firms,
the costs of clearing will go up dramatically.80 These costs will be
passed on to introducing firms and customers, driving up the cost of
doing business, and putting smaller firms out of business.81 However, it
is unclear whether the types of activities necessary to avoid liability
under an aiding and abetting theory would prove unduly costly. In fact,
many clearing firms already have internal processes in place that are likely
to satisfy any additional requirements.82 In any case, rather than viewing
additional costs as a burden on individual investors and small firms, it is
important to realize that clearing firms are in an ideal position to spread
the costs of due diligence to their customers—which may be preferable to
imposing the cost of noncompliance on the individual victims of securities
fraud. It is not at all clear that the individual costs to defrauded investors
are lower than the costs of due diligence by clearing firms.83
73. Jim McTague, Naughty, Naughty, BARRON’S, Sept. 3, 2001, at 31.
74. See REPORT ON MICRO-CAP STOCK FRAUD, supra note 3, at 2–3.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 2–3, 66–69.
77. Michael Schroeder, SEC Collects Only Half Its Financial Penalties, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 26, 1998, at A3.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities Industry Association, Inc. at 16–17,
Koruga v. Fiserv Correspondent Servs., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D. Or. 2001) (No. 001415 MA).
81. See id.
82. See REPORT ON MICRO-CAP STOCK FRAUD, supra note 3, at 78–79.
83. See generally John M. Bellwoar, Note, Bar Baron at the Gate: An Argument
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Finally, clearing firms benefit financially from the fraud by continuing
to process trades for broker-dealers engaged in fraudulent activity.
Clearing is an extremely profitable business for large broker-dealers.84
Clearing firms that continue to extend credit, or fail to report introducing
firms after becoming aware that they are not satisfying their net capital
requirements legitimately, help those firms stay in business in violation of
securities laws. The introducing firms are then able to perpetrate more
violations. By keeping the introducing firm in business, the clearing firm is
attempting to salvage its own financial position relative to the introducing
firms at the expense of the broker’s customers. Under these types of
circumstances, it seems reasonable to extend liability to clearing firms.
III. THE KORUGA ARBITRATION AWARD
In the past few years, there has been a quiet revolution in arbitration
awards—arbitration panels have been finding clearing firms liable for
the fraud of their introducing firms. Arbitration panels rarely, if ever,
provide explanations for their awards, so the legal grounds for such
awards are often unclear. However, in October 2000, an arbitration
panel in Oregon cleared the air by finding the clearing firm Hanifen,
Imhoff Clearing Corporation (now known as Fiserv Correspondent
Services) secondarily liable for the fraud of the boiler room Duke &
Company, and perhaps more importantly, by issuing a lengthy
arbitration award identifying what the panel viewed as the successful
legal theories of liability based on the securities laws of Washington and
California.85 A U.S. district court upheld the award, and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.86
for Expanding the Liability of Securities Clearing Brokers for the Fraud of Introducing
Brokers, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1014 (1999) (arguing in favor of imposing liability based on
economic efficiency).
84. As one journalist aptly stated: “For large brokerages, the clearing business is a
cash cow.” Gary Weiss, Clearing Firm, Clear Thyself, BUS. WK., July 7, 1997, at 120.
85. Koruga v. Wang, No. 98-04276, 2000 WL 33534559, at *1 (N.A.S.D. Oct. 2,
2000) (Meyer, Hywel & Dunnington, Arbs.).
86. Koruga v. Fiserv Correspondent Servs., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1248 (D. Or.
2001), aff’d, No. 01-35295, 2002 WL 530548 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2002) (unpublished
opinion). Due to the liberal standard of review given to arbitration awards, a district
court is unlikely to vacate an award, and an appeals court is unlikely to overturn a district
court decision. A district court may vacate an award if it is completely irrational,
procured by fraud or corruption, or if the panel was aware of the applicable law and yet
completely ignored it. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000); see also United
Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 (1987); Decker v. Merrill
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Although arbitration awards have no precedential value87—they are not
produced by courts of law—the Koruga award has generated a
considerable amount of controversy.88 Arbitration panels often look to the
decisions of other panels for guidance. In fact, the Koruga panel stated:
“We hope our willingness to take on this task will encourage future
NASD panels to be more forthcoming, so that a body of meaningful
precedents, interpreting the securities laws of various states, may become
available . . . .”89 Indeed, the Securities Industry Association (SIA), an
industry trade group, has gone so far as to request that the explanation of the
award be struck.90 This suggests a general awareness by industry members
that other panels may be more likely to issue similar awards if attorneys and
arbitrators are able to use the Koruga explanation to support their positions.
Historically, securities fraud cases have been brought under section
10(b) of the Exchange Act of 1934 (section 10(b))91 and SEC Rule 10b-5
(Rule 10b-5)92 (implementing section 10(b)). In 1994, the Supreme
Court eliminated what had been an implied private right of action for
aiding and abetting under section 10(b) with its decision in Central Bank
of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver.93 Prior to 1994, plaintiffs
and claimants were able to argue that clearing firms had aided and
abetted the fraud of introducing firms, although satisfying the elements
of the cause of action was difficult. Now that there is no federal civil
liability for aiding and abetting, the Koruga award presents us with new
ways to think about clearing firm liability.
IV. LIABILITY FOR SECURITIES FRAUD UNDER THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
A. Primary Liability
In 1933 and 1934, Congress enacted two major pieces of securities
legislation: the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)94 and the Securities
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 205 F.3d 906, 909 (6th Cir. 2000); Todd Shipyards
Corp. v. Cunard Line Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 1991).
87. See DAVID ROBBINS, SECURITIES ARBITRATION PROCEDURE MANUAL 589 (3d
ed. 1998).
88. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 7 (discussing the controversy); Morgenson, supra
note 7, at § 3, at 1.
89. Koruga, 2000 WL 33534559, at *12.
90. Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities Industry Association, Inc. at 1, Koruga, 183
F. Supp. 2d at 1245 (No. 00-1415 MA).
91. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2000)).
92. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001).
93. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
94. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a–77bbbb (2000)).
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Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act).95 The 1933 Act regulates the primary
market (the initial distribution of securities), whereas the 1934 Act regulates
the secondary markets and the postdistribution trading of securities.96
There are a number of different provisions in both Acts relating to
securities fraud, but the majority of fraud claims against broker-dealers
are brought under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Section 10(b) states, in
pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities
exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe . . . .97

This section is not self-operative; the “manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance” must be in violation of some other rule or regulation
established by the SEC. The SEC has established a number of such
rules under section 10(b), including Rule 10b-5.
Rule 10b-5 identifies the specific practices that constitute a violation
of section 10(b):98
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.99

Although section 10(b) does not expressly contain a private right of
action whereby private plaintiffs can sue for damages, courts have been
95. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2000)).
96. The 1934 Act was designed “to deter fraud and manipulative practices in the
securities markets.” Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S.
286, 296 (1993) (quoting Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986)).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
98. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001). For an account of the adoption of Rule 10b-5 in
1942, see IX LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 9, at 4383–84 (3d ed. 1992).
99. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001).
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implying civil liability for violations of the statute for many years.100
As a result of the broad language of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a
large body of federal common law has developed to limit section 10(b)
and bring it in line with common law fraud claims.101 In order to prevail
in a section 10(b) action, the plaintiff must prove the following: that (1)
the defendant made an untrue statement of material fact, (2) the conduct
occurred in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, (3) the
defendant made the statement or omission with scienter,102 (4) the
plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation or omission,103 and (5) the
plaintiff suffered damage as a result.104
It is difficult to establish a clearing broker’s primary liability for
securities fraud under section 10(b). Primarily liability requires that the
plaintiff establish the direct participation of the clearing firm in the
scheme to defraud and that the clearing firm “directly and knowingly
participated in the deceptive or manipulative conduct that caused
damage to the Plaintiffs.”105 If a plaintiff can establish that a clearing
firm is “itself engaged in the kind of manipulative conduct that Section
10(b) prohibits,”106 primary liability to the plaintiff can also be
established. However, in most cases of securities fraud, clearing firms
only participate in the fraud by not preventing the introducing firm from
perpetrating it, not informing the customers of the introducing firm of the
fraud, or benefiting from the ongoing business of the introducing firm.107
In order for an omission to constitute a primary violation, the plaintiff
must establish that the clearing firm had a fiduciary duty to the customer
of the introducing firm.108 Failure to inform customers of the fraud, or
failure to prevent the introducing firm from engaging in fraudulent
activities, is not by itself sufficient to establish direct participation in the
absence of a fiduciary duty.109
100. For a discussion, see Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 171; and IX LOSS & SELIGMAN,
supra note 9, at 4383 n.434 (3d ed. 1992). Note that a “private plaintiff may not bring a
10b-5 suit against a defendant for acts not prohibited by the text of § 10(b).” Central
Bank, 511 U.S. at 173.
101. See VII LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 9, at 3488–89 (3d ed. 1991).
102. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (stating that the
standard cannot be negligence); In re Blech Sec. Litig., 961 F. Supp. 569, 582 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
103. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
104. See Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir.
1992); In re Blech Sec. Litig., 961 F. Supp. at 582; Connolly v. Havens, 763 F. Supp. 6,
10 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Royal Am. Managers, Inc. v. IRC Holding Corp., 885 F.2d
1011, 1015 (2d Cir. 1989)).
105. In re Blech Sec. Litig., 961 F. Supp. at 582.
106. Id. at 583.
107. See discussion supra Part II.C.
108. Ross v. Bolton, 904 F.2d 819, 824 (2d Cir. 1990).
109. Id.
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The fiduciary duty requirement is a major hurdle to finding a clearing
firm primarily liable for an introducing firm’s fraud. In Connolly v.
Havens,110 a New York district court held that even if the plaintiffs could
establish the clearing firm’s direct participation in the fraud, the primary
liability claim would still fail because “[i]t is well-established that a
clearing firm . . . does not have a fiduciary relationship with the
customers . . . of the introducing broker with which it has contracted to
perform clearing services.”111 As a result of this failure to establish a
fiduciary duty, the primary liability claim did not survive the clearing
firm’s motion for summary judgment.112
B. Control Person Liability
Control person liability is a form of secondary liability for securities
fraud. Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act establishes joint and several liability
for those persons who control the persons committing the fraud:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls a person liable under any
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled
person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the
controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce
the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.113

Rule 12b-2 clarifies that control person liability may exist where the
person has “the power to direct or cause the direction of the management
and policies of a person.”114 Courts have regularly held that control
person liability does not apply to clearing firms.
There is a circuit split regarding the proper test for control person
liability.115 Under any test, however, the nature of the post-1982
relationship between clearing firms and introducing firms makes it
difficult to establish that the clearing firm had the power or ability to
control the introducing firm.116 For example, the ability to refuse to
110. 763 F. Supp 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
111. Id. at 10.
112. Id. at 11.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2000).
114. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2001).
115. See Gerald B. Kline & Raymond L. Moss, Liability of Clearing Firms:
Traditional and Developing Perspectives, in 2 SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1998:
REDEFINING PRACTICES AND TECHNIQUES 147–49 (PLI Corporate & Practice Course,
Handbook Series No. B-1062, 1998).
116. See generally Dillon v. Militano, 731 F. Supp 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). See also
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process trades has not been sufficient to establish control person liability.117
Prior to 1982, the NYSE allocated supervisory responsibilities to
clearing firms. In 1982, NYSE Rules 382 and 405 were changed so as to
eliminate the clearing firm’s supervisory responsibilities over the agents of
the introducing firm,118 effectively eliminating the clearing firm’s exposure
to control person liability. Since 1982, clearing firms have continually
argued that they perform no supervisory or oversight functions.119
A few courts have found clearing firms liable under section 20(a), but
these tend to be older decisions.120 Though this type of argument is out
of favor today, some plaintiffs’ attorneys argue that under the current
NYSE Rule 382, clearing firms have to provide regulators with
information regarding the introducing firm, including customer
complaints. Accordingly, they argue, clearing firms have an implied
duty to monitor the behavior of introducing firms.121 However, the
NYSE explicitly states that current reporting obligations “further clarify
the relationship and responsibilities between introducing and carrying
organizations without altering the fundamental carrying/clearing
contractual relationship.”122 Because the duty under section 20(a) did
not exist before the rule changes, a new duty will not be established
under the new rule.
C. Aiding and Abetting Liability
In 1994, the United States Supreme Court changed the face of
securities litigation with its decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver.123 In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme
Court held that “a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and
In re Blech Sec. Litig., 961 F. Supp. 569, 586–87 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that affecting
the actions of an introducing firm is not sufficient to establish that the clearing firm
directed them).
117. See Carlson v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 906 F.2d 315, 318–19 (7th Cir. 1990);
Damato v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 878 F. Supp. 1156, 1160 (N.D.
Ill.1995).
118. See Minnerop, supra note 12, at 848–50.
119. See, e.g., Neiman v. Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis, Inc., 683 F. Supp.
196, 201–02 (1988).
120. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104,
122–23 (W.D. Ark. 1949) (holding that the clearing firm controlled the introducing firm
by way of the clearing agreement, because the clearing firm identified policies regarding
the way business was to be conducted); see Philip M. Aidikoff et al., Clearing Firm
Liability: A Forward Looking Analysis, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1998: REDEFINING
PRACTICES AND TECHNIQUES, supra note 115, at 118–24 (discussing older cases finding
liability under control person theory), WL 1062 PLI/Corp 113.
121. See Aidikoff et al., supra note 120, at 135.
122. NYSE Info. Memo No. 99–33, at 4 (July 1, 1999), available at 1999 NYSE
Info. Memo LEXIS 28.
123. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
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abetting suit under § 10(b).”124 Prior to the Central Bank decision, every
circuit had recognized a private cause of action against aiders and
abettors under section 10(b).125 Although this decision eliminated
federal aiding and abetting liability for securities fraud, the test for
liability—and its application to clearing firms—is still very important,
because some states have interpreted their own secondary liability
provisions by reference to the federal standard.126
Though the interpretation of the test varied by circuit,127 the three-part
test required that the plaintiff establish: (1) a primary violation of section
10(b), (2) actual knowledge or recklessness as to the existence of the
primary violation,128 and (3) “substantial assistance” of the violation.129
Substantial assistance required a “substantial causal connection between
the culpable conduct of the alleged aider and abettor and the harm to the
plaintiff . . . .”130 The elements of knowledge and substantial assistance
were analyzed in reference to one another.131 Both elements posed
problems with regard to clearing firm liability for securities fraud.
The scienter requirement presented a high hurdle for plaintiffs
attempting to impose liability on clearing firms. Most courts required
that the aider have knowledge of the primary violation,132 although there

124. Id. at 191.
125. Id. at 192. Legislation enacted in 1995 gave the SEC the ability to bring aiding
and abetting actions, but Congress decided not to extend this ability to private litigants.
See supra note 56.
126. See, e.g., Foley v. Allard, 427 N.W.2d 647, 650 (Minn. 1988).
127. Most of the circuits based their version of the test on the Restatement (Second)
of Torts formulation. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 194. The Tenth Circuit formulation was
followed by the lower court in Central Bank. Id. at 168.
128. At the time Central Bank was decided, there was a circuit split as to whether
the standard was knowledge, recklessness, awareness of, or intent to further the primary
violation. Generally, the more substantial the assistance, the lower the applicable
scienter standard. See Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting
Securities Fraud: A Critical Examination, 52 ALB. L. REV. 637, 727–39 (1997–1988).
Because of the Central Bank decision, this issue was never resolved.
129. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 168; see also First Interstate Bank of Denver v.
Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 898 (10th Cir. 1992).
130. Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 624 (8th Cir. 1985) (quoting Mendelsohn v.
Capital Underwriters, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1069, 1084 (N.D. Cal. 1979)).
131. See Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 128, at 729. As one court stated, these
two elements should not “be considered in isolation, but rather should be considered
relative to one another.” Metge, 762 F.2d at 624 (citing Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779,
784 (8th Cir. 1981)).
132. See Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 128, at 670–71; see also Connolly v.
Havens, 763 F. Supp. 6, 10–11 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).

1345

FINALFILIPPONE.DOC

2/3/2020 2:22 PM

were significant differences in the interpretation of this requirement.133
In the absence of a fiduciary duty, most courts required at least actual
knowledge of the fraud and, more frequently, intent to defraud.134 This
requirement led to unsuccessful results for plaintiffs who argued that a
clearing firm aided the fraud by failing to stop clearing trades or failing
to notify the plaintiff of the fraud. As with primary liability claims,
clearing firms were able to argue that they had no independent duty to
the customer.135 In the absence of a fiduciary duty, courts required more
than actual knowledge of the primary violation—something closer to
conscious intent to participate in the fraud.136 In effect, this type of
requirement blurred the distinction between primary and secondary liability.
In order to establish the substantial assistance element of aiding and
abetting, the plaintiff had to show that the clearing firm went beyond its
normal clearing duties or that the clearing firm had a fiduciary duty to
the customer of the introducing firm, which it violated by its inaction,
omission, or silence.137 Neither of these was easy to establish. District
courts interpreting this section typically treated performance of standard
clearing firm responsibilities as ministerial or clerical in nature and not
sufficient to establish substantial assistance.138 For example, in Ross v.
Bolton,139 a district court held that clearing trades and loaning money to
the alleged primary violator were not sufficient to establish substantial
assistance because “[a]wareness and approval, standing alone, do not
constitute substantial assistance.”140 Instead, courts required that something
more than “ordinary business activity” be present.141 Under this definition
of substantial assistance, it was easy for a clearing firm to argue successfully
that even if it had actual knowledge of the fraud, continuing to clear trades
and extend credit constituted only normal business activity. The difficulty
of establishing a fiduciary duty to customers has already been discussed; the
same issues arise in this context as well.
Prior to the 1982 changes to NYSE Rules 382 and 405, plaintiffs
could establish the duty element with less difficulty and, as a result,
could demonstrate aiding and abetting liability more easily. In the 1970
133. See Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 128, at 670–700.
134. Id at 671.
135. Stander v. Fin. Clearing & Servs. Corp, 730 F. Supp. 1282, 1286 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); Antinoph v. Laverell Reynolds Sec., Inc., 703 F. Supp. 1185, 1188 (E.D. Pa.
1989); Ross v. Bolton, 639 F. Supp. 323, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
136. Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 128, at 728.
137. Id. at 727–39.
138. See, e.g., Dillon v. Militano, 731 F. Supp. 634, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Antinoph,
703 F. Supp. at 1189.
139. 639 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
140. Id. at 327.
141. Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 128, at 723.
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SEC opinion, D.H. Blair & Co.,142 the SEC imposed on clearing firms
“an independent obligation to make appropriate inquiry and take prompt
steps to terminate any participation in activity violative of the securities
laws.”143 Conceivably, failure to satisfy this obligation could constitute
a duty sufficient to establish liability for aiding and abetting an
introducing firm’s fraud.144
Following the 1982 NYSE rule changes, however, the clearing firm’s
role and obligations changed. In Stander v. Financial Clearing &
Services Corp.,145 a New York district court noted that “the simple
providing of normal clearing services to a primary broker who is acting
in violation of the law does not make out a case of aiding and abetting
against the clearing broker.”146 Because the introducing and clearing
brokers had executed a clearing agreement—making the introducing
firm responsible for supervisory functions required under NYSE Rule
405,147 as permitted by NYSE Rule 382148—the court was unwilling to
“find that Rule 405 imposes any fiduciary duty upon [the clearing firm]
under the circumstances of this case.”149
In any case, with the demise of the implied aiding and abetting cause
of action, there is no longer a federal civil action for secondary aiding
and abetting liability. Following the Central Bank decision, many
predicted that courts and arbitration panels would extend primary
liability to more circumstances than had previously been covered by
142. 44 S.E.C. 320 (1970).
143. Id. at 328.
144. See Cannizzaro v. Bache, Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 719, 721
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). See generally Margaret Hall Found., Inc. v. Atl. Fin. Mgmt., Inc., 572
F. Supp. 1475 (D. Mass. 1983); Faturik v. Woodmere Sec., Inc., 442 F. Supp 943
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). It is unclear whether the duty owed was to the customer as well as to
the regulators. See Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 12, at 61 (arguing that the courts
misunderstood the nature of the requirement when interpreting this section as involving a
duty to the customer).
145. 730 F. Supp. 1282 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
146. Id. at 1286.
147. NYSE CONSTITUTION AND RULES, Rule 405, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2405
(Aug. 31, 1999).
148. NYSE CONSTITUTION AND RULES, Rule 382, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2382.
149. Stander, 730 F. Supp. at 1287. The Stander court did not deal with the kinds
of stock fraud described earlier; instead, the case involved excessive and unsuitable
trading in a customer account perpetrated by an individual broker employed by the
introducing firm. The case turned on whether the clearing firm had the duty to monitor
or supervise the individual broker. Because the clearing agreement clearly delegated the
supervision of individual brokers to the introducing firm, the court found no liability for
the clearing firm. Id.
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aiding and abetting liability.150 However, this extension has not
materialized.151 As a result of these developments, the answer to
clearing firm liability for the fraud of introducing firms is not likely to
be found in primary violations of federal securities laws.
V. SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR CLEARING FIRMS UNDER THE UNIFORM
SECURITIES ACT OF 1956
A. Problems Regarding the Development of Case Law
One of the issues facing arbitration panels that hear cases involving
clearing firms is the relative lack of post-Central Bank case law, in both
the federal and the state arena. Ever since the Supreme Court upheld
mandatory arbitration for nearly all customer claims against brokers in
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,152 the vast majority of
cases have gone to arbitration as opposed to federal or state court.153
Because arbitration awards do not have precedential value and very few
cases make it into the court system, there has been very little, if any,
development of the law.154
A second, related problem with the development of the law in this
area is that even when arbitration panels have been willing to extend
liability to clearing firms, they are not required to, and rarely do,
provide any kind of explanation for their decision.155 As a result,
future arbitration panels that might consider extending liability have no
real guidance as to how this might be done and cannot feel confident
that their decision is consistent with those of other panels.
Arbitration awards can be appealed to U.S. district courts; courts
typically uphold the awards because as long as some theory of liability

150. See, e.g., S. Scott Luton, The Ebb & Flow of § 10(b) Jurisprudence: An
Analysis of Central Bank, 17 U. ARK. L. J. 45, 47 (1994).
151. See Jill E. Fisch, The Scope of Private Securities Litigation: In Search of
Liability Standards for Secondary Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1300–03 (1999)
(discussing circuit splits regarding the extension of primary liability to “outside
professionals”); Richard H. Walker & David M. Levine, The Limits of Central Bank’s
Textualist Approach—Attempts to Overdraw the Bank Prove Unsuccessful, 26 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1, 46 (1997) (addressing line drawing between primary and secondary liability).
152. 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987).
153. Koruga v. Wang, No. 98-04276, 2000 WL 33534559 at *10 (N.A.S.D. Oct. 2,
2000) (Meyer, Hywel & Dunnington, Arbs.).
154. Id. at *11.
155. Arbitration awards are typically a few paragraphs long and simply state who is
liable and for how much. Most do not even attempt to justify the award. See, e.g., GMS
Group, L.L.C. v. Herbert J. Sims & Co., No. 00-05205, 2002 WL 31058232 (N.A.S.D.
Aug. 8, 2002); Rothberg v. Acument Sec., Inc., No. 01-03023, 2002 WL 1948217
(N.A.S.D. Aug. 6, 2002).
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makes the award possible, there is no “manifest disregard of the law.”156
In general, the only real authority provided by these decisions is that
district courts are willing to hold that clearing firms can conceivably be
found liable for something. These types of decisions are better than
nothing; plaintiffs’ attorneys often rely on them when arguing in favor of
expanding liability. However, the decisions do not provide the kind of
body of case law available in other areas of law. Since the demise of
aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b) and the enforcement of
mandatory arbitration clauses in customer agreements, there has been very
little case law testing the extent of secondary liability under state law.
B. The Content of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956
The Uniform Act states that there is a private right of action for all
fraud claims brought under it.157 Section 101 is similar to Rule 10b-5:
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of
any security, directly or indirectly
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person.158

Section 410 of the Uniform Act limits civil enforcement to buyers
of securities.159 Section 410(b) of the Uniform Act identifies the
persons liable under section 101, and provides for a right of
contribution:
Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller liable under subsection
(a), every partner, officer, or director of such a seller, every person occupying a
similar status or performing similar functions, every employee of such a seller
who materially aids in the sale, and every broker-dealer or agent who materially
aids in the sale are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as
the seller, unless the non-seller who is so liable sustains the burden of proof that
he did not know, and in exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the
156. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.
1991). See generally Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000) (providing the law
governing the vacation of arbitration awards by courts).
157. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 410 (amended 1958), 7C U.L.A. 266 (2000).
158. Id. § 101, 7C U.L.A. 110.
159. Id. § 410, 7C U.L.A. 266.
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existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist. There is
contribution as in cases of contract among the several persons so liable.160

Three elements must be established in order to show that section
410(b) applies to a particular defendant: (1) a primary violation of
section 101; (2) the defendant is a broker-dealer or agent as required by
section 410(b); and (3) the defendant “materially aided” in the sale. The
defendant can then establish that it had no reason to know of the facts
constituting the violation as an affirmative defense.
The Uniform Act cause of action for secondary liability differs
markedly from the former aiding and abetting under section 10(b).
First, liability is restricted to the class of persons identified in the
statute, which includes broker-dealers. Second, “materially aids in the
sale” is not defined, and there is no reason to think it is identical to the
former “substantial assistance” requirement under federal law.
Finally, the federal standard required that the plaintiff show that the
defendant had at least actual knowledge of the primary offense.
Under the Uniform Act formulation, however, once the plaintiff has
shown that the defendant materially aided in the sale, it is up to the
defendant to show that he did not know, and could not have known,
“of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist.”161
This amounts to a negligence standard, which is much easier for
plaintiffs to establish.
C. State Court Interpretations of Section 410(b)
Few cases have dealt explicitly with secondary liability for
brokerage firms under state antifraud laws. The Alabama Supreme
Court remarked in 1986 that “[i]t is interesting that while this section
is based almost verbatim on § 410-(b) of the Uniform Securities Act,
adopted in Alabama in 1959, and which has been adopted by many
other states, there are few cases from other jurisdictions which give
guidance” regarding the interpretation of the section.162 Only a
handful of states have considered the extent of secondary liability
under statutes based on the Uniform Act, even though the vast
majority of states have adopted some form of its antifraud
provisions.163 In all but one case,164 the courts have recognized that
160. Id. § 410(b), 7C U.L.A. 266 (emphasis added).
161. Id.
162. Foster v. Jesup & Lamont Sec. Co., 482 So. 2d 1201, 1207 (Ala. 1986).
163. See I LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 9, at 73–76 & nn.114–16.
164. In Foley v. Allard, a pre-Central Bank decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court
decided to follow the federal aiding and abetting test over that provided by its own state
statute, which is based on section 410 of the Uniform Act. 427 N.W.2d 647, 650–51

1350

FINALFILIPPONE.DOC

[VOL. 39: 1327, 2002]

2/3/2020 2:22 PM

Clearing Firm Liability
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

the statute goes considerably beyond the former federal aiding and
abetting cause of action.165
The Alabama Supreme Court was one of the first courts to interpret
section 410(b) in Foster v. Jesup and Lamont Securities Co.166 In
Foster, the Eleventh Circuit certified a number of questions regarding
the application of state securities laws to the Alabama Supreme Court,
noting that Alabama securities law—which mirrors the Uniform Act—
was significantly broader than federal law. The Alabama court provided
the following summary of its blue sky law:
[A]ll [the plaintiff] need do is establish the defendant’s status, either as a
controlling person, a partner, or an occupant of some other statutory
classification [as here a broker-dealer who materially aids in the sale], plus the
fact of the seller’s liability. The defendant is then left with only one
defense . . . . He may show that he did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of the facts by reason of
which the seller’s liability is alleged to exist.167

Oregon’s version of section 410(b) is also very important to this
discussion because there is a substantial amount of case law interpreting
the provision.168 This is due at least in part to Oregon’s revision to the
Uniform Act that extended liability for materially aiding a violation of
section 101 to “every person,” not just “every broker dealer and
(Minn. 1988). The court based its reasoning on another section of the Minnesota
Securities Act, stating: “[T]he Minnesota Securities Act is to be construed so as to
‘coordinate the interpretation of [the state statutes] with the related federal regulation.’
We have determined, therefore, that federal case law is of considerable value as
precedent in deciding issues arising under the act.” Id. at 650 (citations omitted)
(quoting Specialized Tours, Inc. v. Hagen, 392 N.W.2d 520, 534 (Minn. 1986)). The
court then applied the three-part federal aiding and abetting test. Id. It is not clear what
the Minnesota court would have decided in the absence of a federal aiding and abetting
theory.
165. See, e.g., Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1327 (8th Cir. 1991)
(applying Arkansas law), aff’d sub nom., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993);
Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Giacomi, 699 A.2d 101 (Conn. 1997); Conn. Nat’l Bank v.
Giacomi, 659 A.2d 1166, 1176 (Conn. 1995); Iowa ex rel Goettsch v. Diacide Distribs.,
Inc., 561 N.W.2d 369, 374 (Iowa 1997); Prince v. Brydon, 764 P.2d 1370, 1372 (Or.
1988); Adams v. Am. W. Sec., 510 P.2d 838, 844 (Or. 1973); Foster, 482 So. 2d at 1207.
166. 482 So. 2d 1201 (Ala. 1986).
167. Id. at 1207 (emphasis in original) (alteration in original) (quoting J. Michael
Rediker, Alabama’s “Blue Sky Law”—Its Dubious History and Its Current Renaissance,
23 ALA. L. REV. 667, 714 (1971)).
168. The Koruga panel relied heavily on Oregon case law in determining whether
Fiserv had materially aided the sale of securities. See Koruga v. Wang, No. 98-04276,
2000 WL 33534559 at *18 (N.A.S.D. Oct. 2, 2000) (Meyer, Hywel & Dunnington,
Arbs.).
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agent.”169 This change has resulted in more cases going into the court
system, rather than into arbitration.170
D. Applying Section 410(b) to Clearing Firms
1. Definition of Broker-Dealer
Section 401(c) of the Uniform Act defines broker-dealer as “any person
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the
account of others . . . .”171 “Effecting transactions” is not further defined.
In Koruga, Fiserv Correspondent Services (formerly Hanifen, Imhoff
Clearing Corporation) argued that it was not a broker-dealer because it
was “not engaged in the business of ‘effecting transactions in securities for
the accounts of others.’”172 However, it is difficult to see how this could
be the case. Clearing firms are engaged in the business of bringing about, or
effecting, securities transactions; that is, after all, why they are retained.173
In its amicus brief in support of the clearing firm’s appeal of the
Koruga award, the SIA claimed that a distinction should be made
between the registration status of a firm that engages in “‘central and
specialized’ functions that impact on a customer’s decision to buy or sell
securities” and the essentially “clerical” and “operational” functions
performed by the clearing firm.174 They argued that although a clearing
firm is required to register as a broker-dealer, the difference between the
functions performed by the two firms is what is relevant to the definition
of broker-dealer under the Uniform Act.175 However, the definition of
broker-dealer does not distinguish between effecting transactions,
soliciting transactions, or participating in transactions.176 In fact, primary
liability for fraud is applied to broker-dealers who solicit or participate
in the sale under section 410(a).177 In order for a separate provision for
secondary liability for broker-dealers to make sense at all, effecting
transactions could not be identical to soliciting or participating in them.
169. OR. REV. STAT. § 59.115(3) (2001).
170. Koruga, 2000 WL 33534559 at *18.
171. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 401(c) (amended 1958), 7C U.L.A. 188 (2000). A few cases
have addressed whether specific entities come under the categories of “broker-dealer or
agent.” See, e.g., Atlanta Skin & Cancer Clinic v. Hallmark Gen. Partners, 463 S.E.2d
600, 603 (S.C. 1995) (holding that a bank is not a broker-dealer or agent under the
statute).
172. Koruga, 2000 WL 33534559, at *16.
173. The Koruga panel quickly disposed of Fiserv’s argument. Id.
174. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities Industry Association, Inc. at 23, Koruga
v. Fiserv Correspondent Servs., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D. Or. 2001) (No. 00-1415 MA).
175. See id.
176. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 401(c), 7C U.L.A. 188.
177. Id. § 410(a), 7C U.L.A. 266.
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2. The Material Aid Requirement
The element most likely to pose problems for those arguing in favor of
secondary liability for clearing firms is the “material aid” requirement.
Courts have regularly held that the material aid standard is not identical
to the former substantial assistance standard.178 For example, in Foster
v. Jesup & Lamont Securities Co.,179 the Alabama Supreme Court
considered whether “materially aid” involved a looser standard than, or
an identical standard to that imposed by the “substantial factor”
requirement necessary to find liability under section 12(2) of the 1933
Act.180 The court responded that it was not necessary to show that a
person was a substantial factor in the sale of a security in order to
establish that he had materially aided in the sale of securities.181
The courts addressing the statute have interpreted “aiding” broadly.182
According to one commentator, aiding “focuses upon activities which do
not directly lead to the sale, but rather make it possible.”183 Under the
Uniform Act, “materiality relates to the importance of the contribution
toward making the sale possible.”184 By way of contrast, Ohio’s blue

178. A number of states have already held (or have stated in dicta) that “materially
aid” does involve a lower standard than “substantial assistance.” See, e.g., Arthur Young
& Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying Arkansas law), aff’d sub nom.,
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993); Foster v. Jesup & Lamont Sec. Co., 482
So. 2d 1201 (Ala. 1986); Iowa ex rel. Goettsch v. Diacide Distribs., Inc. 561 N.W.2d 369
(Iowa 1997); Prince v. Brydon, 764 P.2d 1370 (Or. 1988).
179. 482 So. 2d 1201 (Ala. 1986).
180. Id. at 1204. Foster dealt with the sale of an unregistered security under section
12(2) of the 1933 Act rather than fraud in the sale of a security on the secondary market
under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. The test for establishing fraud under section 12(2)
relies on whether the aider was a “substantial factor in the sale” and whether the district
court had treated the “substantial factor” identically to the “materially aid” requirement. Id.
181. Id. at 1207–08. The Eighth Circuit relied on the Foster court’s interpretation
of section 410(b) when it considered a similar case based on Arkansas law. In Arthur
Young & Co. v. Reves, the Eighth Circuit compared Arkansas and Alabama securities
laws and agreed that Arkansas has its own statutory aiding and abetting provision. 937
F.2d at 1326. The court concluded that the trial court had set a higher standard than was
necessary to meet the “materially aid” standard in its jury instructions but that, because
the jury found that the higher standard had been met, there had been no error. Id. at
1327. The court did not identify any criteria for “materially aid,” stating only that “the
trial evidence provides ample support for the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 1326.
182. For a discussion addressing the differences between aiding and participating,
and aiding and abetting, see Joseph C. Long, Developments and Issues in Civil Liability
Under Blue Sky Law, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 439, 460–63 (1993).
183. Id. at 461.
184. Id. at 462.
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sky laws do not limit aid to material aid—aid of any kind will do.185
This caveat makes the Ohio statute very broad. The materiality
requirement in the Uniform Act provides an important limitation on the
type of aid necessary for liability.186
The Oregon Supreme Court has provided some guidance in interpreting
the material aid requirement. In Prince v. Brydon,187 the court explained
that participating in a sale is not necessary or sufficient to establish material
aid; instead, it depends on the importance of the party’s contribution to the
sale.188 Additionally, in an earlier case, the court held that an attorney had
materially aided in the sale of securities even though the aid consisted of
preparing documents after the unauthorized sale took place.189 The court
stated that the “sale would and could not have been completed or
consummated” without the assistance of the attorney and that the timing of
the sale was unrelated to the material aid provided by him.190
Prince suggests that activities such as “[t]yping, reproducing, and
delivering sales documents” are activities aiding a sale, although they
are not necessarily material, because they could be performed by
anyone.191 The term “material” provides the essential limitation on
liability in the context of the Uniform Act, just as the term “substantial”
provided the limitation in the substantial assistance test. With respect to
attorney preparation of documents, “it is a drafter’s knowledge,
185. In Federated Management Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, an Ohio appeals court
provided for an expansive interpretation of the Ohio version of section 410. 738 N.E.2d
842, 860–62 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000). The Ohio statute goes significantly beyond section
410, providing that “every person who has participated in or aided the seller in any way
in making such a contract or sale” is jointly and severally liable. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1707.43 (West 1994 & Supp. 2002). See also Federated Mgmt. Co., 738 N.E.2d at 861
(noting that the federal requirement that the aider and abettor have the intent to aid in the
violation is not required under state law). The Federated Mgmt. Co. court held that the
participation or assistance may be in any form; contrary to the holding of the trial court,
it is not necessary that the aider “induce a purchaser to invest in order to be held liable,”
although that may be “one factor in determining liability.” Id.; see also Marc I.
Steinberg, The Emergence of State Securities Laws: Partly Sunny Skies for Investors, 62
U. CIN. L. REV. 395, 424 n.152 (1993).
186. Steinberg, supra note 185, at 424–25.
187. 764 P.2d 1370 (Or. 1988).
188. A person may participate without materially aiding or materially aid without
participating. Whether one’s assistance in the sale is ‘material’ does not
depend on one’s knowledge of the facts that make it unlawful; it depends on
the importance of one’s personal contribution to the transaction. Typing,
reproducing, and delivering sales documents may all be essential to a sale, but
they could be performed by anyone; it is a drafter’s knowledge, judgment, and
assertions reflected in the contents of the documents that are “material” to the
sale.
Id. at 1371.
189. Adams v. Am. W. Sec., Inc., 510 P.2d 838, 844–45 (Or. 1973).
190. Id. at 845.
191. Prince, 764 P.2d at 1371.
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judgment, and assertions reflected in the contents of the documents that
are ‘material’ to the sale.”192 This seems to be what the district court had
in mind in Hirata Corp. v. J.B. Oxford & Co.,193 when it cited Prince in
support of the proposition that “those courts interpreting § 410 of the
Uniform Act have not applied liability for ‘materially aiding’ to one who
merely performed ‘ministerial functions.’”194
The contrast with ministerial functions is not to be confused with
normal or typical functions, however. The Prince court makes it clear that
“[t]he defense against strict liability . . . was to be a showing of ignorance,
not the professional role of the person who renders material aid in the
unlawful sale.”195 The normal activities of a lawyer preparing documents
do constitute material aid of the sale;196 the lawyer must make a showing
that he “did not know, and, in the exercise of reasonable care, could not
have known, of the existence of the facts on which liability is based.”197
The Koruga arbitration panel found that Fiserv had materially aided the
sale of securities by executing purchases and sales of securities, passing
title to securities, sending confirmation slips and monthly or quarterly
statements to customers, insuring customer accounts as required by SIPC,
and extending credit to customers and to Hanifen.198 The panel stated:
“To analogize the ministerial role of a data-inputting secretary to the very
substantial functions of the clearing broker makes no sense. Without the
clearing broker, title in securities cannot pass to or from the customer nor
can consideration for the transaction change hands.”199
In its amicus brief in support of the clearing firm’s appeal of the
Koruga award, the SIA argued that the ordinary activities of clearing
brokers are “operational,” “clerical,” and “ministerial” in nature.200 The
normal activities of a clearing firm with respect to processing
192. Id.
193. 193 F.R.D. 589 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
194. Id. at 600.
195. Prince, 764 P.2d at 1372.
196. Id. at 1371–72.
197. Id. at 1372 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 59.115(3) (2001)).
198. Koruga v. Wang, No. 98-04276, 2000 WL 33534559 at *20–21 (N.A.S.D. Oct. 2,
2000) (Meyer, Hywel & Dunnington, Arbs.).
199. Id. at *20.
200. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities Industry Association, Inc. at 17–24,
Koruga v. Fiserv Correspondent Servs., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D. Or. 2001) (No. 001415 MA); see also Denson v. Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp., 682 So. 2d 69 (Ala. 1996)
(upholding summary judgment in favor of the defendant Bear, Stearns on grounds that
the plaintiff had not shown that Bear, Stearns had performed anything other than
bookkeeping functions with regard to the initial public offering of securities).
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transactions and other documents are “ministerial” in the sense that
processing, as opposed to selling, is involved. However, the processing
involved is quite complex, and the execution of transactions and the
transfer of title to securities are not simply clerical activities. They
require expertise and systems not available to most introducing firms.201
In addition, clearing firms engage in a number of activities that go
well beyond simply making the transactions occur. 202 For example,
assessments regarding whether to accept an order for processing and
when to extend credit involve knowledge and judgment, although the
mechanical distribution of monthly statements may not. Decisions
regarding whether to execute a transaction in an account after a customer
has requested that the clearing firm not execute any further transactions
involve judgment. Clearing firms identify an introducing firm’s
compliance with net capital requirements. As the Bear, Stearns SEC
action demonstrates, a clearing firm that continues to process
transactions with knowledge that the introducing firm is violating the net
capital rule is aiding and abetting a violation of federal securities laws.203
These activities may be the normal activities of the clearing firm acting
in its professional role, but that does not make the activities any less
material. As the court in Prince noted, a lawyer may be performing the
normal professional duties of a lawyer in preparing documents and in so
doing materially aid in the sale of securities.204 The fact that the activities
themselves are typical for a lawyer was irrelevant to liability; instead, the
relevant question is whether the lawyer had knowledge of facts on which
the liability was based.205 Similarly, the fact that a clearing firm is performing
its normal professional responsibilities does not render the duties
“ministerial” and therefore outside of the scope of liability. Instead, as
long as the duties involve a “personal contribution to the transaction,”206 the
clearing firm will need to show that it did not have knowledge of the fraud.
201. See Minnerop, supra note 12, at 842–43.
202. In a recent case, a New York district court upheld an arbitration award against
Bear, Stearns in connection with the A.R. Baron fraud. McDaniel v. Bear Stearns & Co.,
196 F. Supp. 2d 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The arbitration panel had found that the following
activities went beyond the scope of normal clearing activities: failing to report
commissions and markups, processing trades that it knew were unauthorized, making
loans to help A.R. Baron meet net capital requirements, making decisions regarding
whether to process certain trades, and placing staff at the office of the introducing firm.
Id. at 356. The district court held that these activities provided a sufficient basis for
upholding the award finding that Bear, Stearns had provided substantial assistance to
A.R. Baron and had aided and abetted the fraud under New York law. Id.
203. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. The SEC can bring aiding and
abetting actions under Rule 10b-5. See supra note 56.
204. Prince v. Brydon, 764 P.2d 1370, 1372 (Or. 1988).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1371.
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3. The Affirmative Defense
Section 410(b) states that a broker-dealer who materially aids in a sale
that is in violation of section 101 is jointly and severally liable with the
seller, “unless the non-seller who is so liable sustains the burden of proof
that he did not know, and in exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is
alleged to exist.”207 Essentially, the defendant must prove that he could not
have discovered the facts even had he exercised due care.208 As the
Oregon court stated in Prince, for one working in a professional capacity,
“[t]he defense against strict liability . . . [is] a showing of ignorance, not the
professional role of the person who renders material aid in the unlawful
sale.”209 In addition, the ignorance at issue is ignorance of the “facts by
reason of which liability is alleged to exist”210 and not ignorance of the
unlawfulness of the sale; the defendant need not even know that the sale
was unlawful as long as he knew the facts that gave rise to the liability.211
The affirmative defense will be hard to establish for clearing firms
dealing with introducing firms engaged in widespread fraud. If the
evidence of fraud amounts to a failure legally to satisfy net capital
requirements, widespread customer complaints of unauthorized trading
and failure to execute sell orders, or other notable signs of fraud, a
clearing firm would have known of the facts on which liability is based.
The Koruga panel appeared to have no difficulty establishing that Fiserv

207. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 410(b) (amended 1958), 7C U.L.A. 266 (2000).
208. In Connecticut National Bank v. Giacomi, the Connecticut Supreme Court held
that Connecticut’s aiding and abetting statute established a negligence standard as to the
knowledge requirement. 699 A.2d 101, 124 n.40 (Conn. 1997). After the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case that a primary securities violation existed and that the
defendant materially aided the violation, the defendant “can avoid liability if it can
sustain its burden of persuasion that it did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known, of the untruth or omission which constituted the violation of
the securities law.” Id. at 123.
209. Prince, 764 P.2d at 1372.
210. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 410(b), 7C U.L.A. 266.
211. See also Hines v. Data Line Sys., Inc., 787 P.2d 8 (Wash. 1990).
Ignorance will be bliss only to the extent that [a defendant] can prove that even
by the exercise of reasonable care he would have remained ignorant of the true
state of affairs. . . . The clear language of [the statute] imposes upon [a
defendant] the burden of affirmatively proving that in the exercise of
reasonable care they could not have learned [of the existence of the facts
giving rise to the liability].
Id. at 18–19.
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had actual knowledge of the fraud.212 If a clearing firm does not know
of the fraud, it is likely due to a failure to follow appropriate regulations,
which would constitute a failure to exercise due care. In such a case, the
clearing firm should have known of the facts on which liability is based.
This is true because clearing firms are required to report complaints and
violations of net capital to appropriate SROs. These are exactly the
types of cases where clearing firm liability ought to extend.
The defense available to clearing firms in less egregious cases is that
the firm had no reason to know of the facts constituting the violation. If
the clearing firm followed appropriate SEC and SRO rules and
regulations, and adhered to its agreements with the introducing firm and
its customers, and yet still could not have known of the fraud, then under
this interpretation of the affirmative defense, no liability will extend.
The defense would seem to be available in most cases involving the
fraud of an introducing firm, such as unsuitability claims.
The issue in close cases will be whether the clearing firm should have
known of the facts constituting the primary violation. For example, in a
case where the introducing firm fabricates trading experience on an
option agreement, the clearing firm can argue that in the exercise of
reasonable care it could not have known of the existence of the violation.
An example of where liability might be extended is in the case of
excessive commissions or mark-ups. Clearing firms produce commission
reports for introducing firms, for example, and so might be said to know
of the facts giving rise to the violation. In addition, a clearing firm may
receive complaints from customers regarding excessive commissions.
Under this construction of the knowledge defense, clearing firm
liability would not be extended to cases where either the clearing firm
had no knowledge of the facts on which the fraud was based, or the
clearing firm’s lack of knowledge was not due to its failure to follow
appropriate regulations or otherwise exercise reasonable care.213 This
standard should not be difficult to meet for most clearing firms under
most circumstances. Liability would be imposed in only the most
egregious situations—those situations in which the clearing firm knew
of the fraud yet continued to aid the introducing firm in perpetrating it
and cases in which, had the clearing firm followed the appropriate
regulations and procedures, the fraud would have been apparent.

212. Koruga v. Wang, No. 98-04276, 2000 WL 33534559 at *7–8 (N.A.S.D. Oct. 2,
2000) (Meyer, Hywel & Dunnington, Arbs.).
213. Willful ignorance should be considered knowledge in such cases, because the
clearing firm will have had reason to believe that the fraud was occurring, and yet turned
a blind eye nonetheless.
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E. Federal Preemption?
The SIA has argued that application of section 410(b) to clearing
brokers creates “a direct conflict with federal law and regulation,”214
because in order to come under the affirmative defense provided by
section 410(b), the clearing firm must exercise reasonable care.215 The
argument seems to be that insofar as section 410(b) requires that more
attention be paid to the activities of the introducing firm, it is in conflict
with federal law and federal regulations. Because the Uniform Act is
meant to coordinate with federal regulation,216 blue sky laws are not able
to impose any additional duties on clearing firms.217 However, the
antifraud provisions of the Uniform Act are not preempted by either SRO
or SEC regulation nor are they preempted by any federal legislation.218
First of all, blue sky laws work in conjunction with other forms of
regulation and are valid insofar as there is no explicit conflict with
federal law. States are free to enact legislation imposing duties
additional to those provided by self-regulatory agencies. The regulatory
framework provided by SROs such as the NYSE or NASD does not
preempt state law. According to the Supreme Court, state law must not
conflict with SRO rules “only if the rules are directly related to the
purpose of the 1934 Act and are designed to insure fair dealing and
investor protection.”219 NYSE Rule 382 and NASD Rule 3230 are
internal rules. There is no private right of action available to investors for
their violation. As a result, their purpose does not seem connected to the
purposes of the 1934 Act.220 In addition, section 410(b) does not create a
214. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities Industry Association, Inc. at 26, Koruga
v. Fiserv Correspondent Servs., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D. Or. 2001) (No. 00-1415 MA).
215. Id. at 25–26.
216. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 415 (amended 1958), 7C U.L.A. 320 (2000).
217. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities Industry Association, Inc. at 26, Koruga
(No. 00-1415 MA).
218. For an account of the constitutional limits on the preemption of state securities
laws, see generally Manning Gilbert Warren III, Federalism and Investor Protection:
Constitutional Restraints on Preemption of State Remedies for Securities Fraud, 60 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1997, at 169. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae North
American Securities Administrators Association, Inc. at 5–22, Koruga (No. 00-1415
MA) (criticizing preemption arguments made by appellant and the SIA); I LOSS &
SELIGMAN, supra note 9, at 41–42.
219. Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1201 (9th Cir. 1998)
(“The rules of NASD and the NYSE are not fairly attributable to the government unless
they carry the force of federal law.”); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae North American
Securities Administrators Association, Inc. at 16, Koruga (No. 00-1415 MA).
220. See Brief of Amicus Curiae North American Securities Administrators
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conflict with these rules; the rules set SRO minimum standards for
participation in the securities markets, but there is no reason to suppose that
Congress or the states cannot create higher standards.221 In fact, the 1998
SEC-approved amendments to NYSE Rule 382 and NASD Rule 3230 state
that the rule changes are not intended to affect any “liabilities under law.”222
The 1933 and 1934 Acts explicitly preserve state causes of action.223
State blue sky laws had existed for many years prior to the 1933 and
1934 Acts.224 Although the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
of 1998 preempts some state causes of action, it applies to class actions
and not to those suing in an individual capacity.225 By limiting the
preemption of state antifraud laws to securities class actions, Congress
has continued to make state blue sky and common law causes of action
available to individual investors.226
VI. CONCLUSION
The Koruga award demonstrates the potential power of state law in
establishing secondary liability for clearing firms. A careful reading of
the Uniform Act shows that clearing firms may be liable for the fraud of
introducing firms under some circumstances. Consistent application of
state law, as it presently exists in states adopting the antifraud provisions
of the Uniform Act, provides a means for extending secondary liability
to clearing firms for the fraud of introducing firms.
Liability under the Uniform Act does not impose too heavy a duty on
clearing firms. If a clearing firm had no knowledge of the fraud and
follows the regulations imposed by applicable SROs and the SEC, that
firm should not be liable. All that is required under these circumstances is
the normal monitoring procedures that should be in place in all clearing
Association, Inc. at 16 (No. 00-1415 MA).
221. Id.
222. See NASD Notice to Members No. 99-57, at 1 (July 19, 1999),
http://www.nasdr.com/pdf-text/9957ntm.txt; Brief of Amicus Curiae North American
Securities Administrators Association, Inc. at 20, Koruga v. Fiserv Correspondent Servs.,
183 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D. Or. 2001) (No. 00-1415 MA) (citing Proposed Rule Change by
NYSE, File No. SR-NYSE-97-25, at 7–8 (Nov. 25, 1998)).
223. 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2000) (stating the rule under the 1933 Act) (“[T]he rights and
remedies provided by this [Act] shall be in addition to any and all other rights and
remedies that may exist at law or in equity.”); 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2000) (stating the
rule under the 1934 Act) (“[T]he rights and remedies provided by this [Act] shall be in
addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity.”).
224. For a history of the development of blue sky laws, see I LOSS & SELIGMAN,
supra note 9, at 31–43.
225. 15 U.S.C. § 77p.
226. For a discussion of legislative history preserving private individual causes of
action, see Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of
State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 n.2 (1998).
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firms. However, in cases like the Duke & Company and A.R. Baron
frauds, where the clearing firms were found to have actual knowledge of
the fraud, the firm would be liable to the defrauded investor.
Clearing firms argue that the imposition of liability will drastically
increase the costs of clearing and put smaller introducing firms out of
business. However, under the interpretation of the Uniform Act
explored above, clearing firms would not be required to have in place
any additional monitoring procedures beyond those required by their
SROs and the SEC. They simply would not be allowed to profit from
the fraud of introducing firms once they know of the fraud, or benefit
from failing to follow those regulations, which are often designed
specifically to prevent fraud. Any profits received in this manner are
illegitimate in any case, and it can hardly be argued that preventing
clearing firms from realizing them increases their costs.
Although existing liability under state law may not go far enough for
some and will not help residents of those states where liability follows
federal law, victims of fraud in Uniform Act states may be able to obtain
some relief by focusing on state law. Existing state law as constructed
under the Uniform Act does not leave clearing firms open to liability for
all activities of an introducing firm, nor should it. It does, however,
provide for potential liability when clearing firms provide knowing
assistance to introducing firms that are committing fraud.
Clearing firms are in an ideal position to prevent fraud. Smaller
brokerage firms require their services. Clearing firms provide access to
the securities markets for these firms. They also come to know the
business of the firm through day-to-day interaction. By making it
expensive for clearing firms to continue to clear for introducing firms
engaged in fraud, they are prevented from profiting from defrauded
investors. By preventing introducing firms engaged in fraud from having
access to securities markets, we provide a powerful means of controlling
fraud. Civil liability of this type puts pressure on clearing firms to be
more selective in their choice of customers and makes it more costly for
them to ignore mounting customer complaints against introducing firms.
JEANNETTE FILIPPONE
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